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Abstract 
 
Recently, the H-1B visa program has been a target of reform under the Trump 
administration. This study explores whether the employment of H-1B physicians in U.S. 
hospitals has any effect on the quality of healthcare provided. As indicators of quality, I 
use patient survey scores as well as mortality and readmission rates. This new 
econometric evidence suggests that patient perception of quality is not influenced by 
prejudice toward nonimmigrant physicians, but provides inconclusive results for the 
rate-based measures of healthcare quality.  
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I. Introduction 
For many years, immigration policy has been a heavily controversial subject in 
economic and political fields. The debate has been further intensified by the most recent 
presidential campaigns and the subsequent election. Even at the most superficial level 
of analysis, there is a definite relationship between immigration and the economy. 
Immigration expands two economic parameters; the supply of workers in labor markets 
and the total consumption of goods both increase with the number of migrants. Though 
these results can be interpreted as beneficial for the economy, the debate lies mostly in 
the increased competition for American citizens to gain employment. Roughly 13 
percent of the U.S. population consists of immigrants, yet they make up 16 percent of 
the labor force and own more small business than U.S.-born workers because they are 
disproportionately concentrated at the peak working age range1. In the political 
dimension, many legislators and citizens alike argue that immigration laws should 
become more stringent to protect American jobs. 
One of the latest targets for immigration policy reform is the H-1B visa 
program. The H-1B program was created in 1990 to grant visas to skilled nonimmigrant 
workers. Under the program, skilled workers are defined as having at minimum a 
bachelor’s degree or the equivalent. Currently, the cap on foreign workers is 65,000 per 
year, with an additional 20,000 granted to those who received a master’s or doctorate 
degree in the U.S. The lottery by which the visas are granted has two stages. First, there 
is a lottery for the 20,000 with advanced degrees. The secondary step is for the 
bachelor’s degree category. Those who were not selected in the first round are entered 
                                                
1 Economic Policy Institute, “Facts About Immigration and the U.S. Economy” 
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into the drawing for 65,000 slots. If the cap is reached in the first 5 business days, there 
is an additional preliminary lottery to decide which applications are processed. H-1B 
visas are in such high demand that in every year since 2013, the cap has been reached 
within this designated time period2. The visas are especially sought after by foreign 
workers in STEM fields, such as engineering, computer science, architecture, and 
medicine3. H-1B visas are effective for a period of three years, which can be extended 
to six years through a second application. 
Employers sponsoring H-1B petitions face certain economic stipulations put 
forth by the Department of Labor to ensure they comply with the intention of the visa 
program4. They must compensate foreign workers with either the set wage for the 
position within the company or the prevailing wage in the industry set by state 
employment agencies, whichever is higher. Sponsors are required to declare that the 
hiring of H-1B workers will not have a negative impact on the working conditions of 
other employees in the company. If for any reason work is halted (e.g. strikes), the 
employer must notify the Department of Labor within 10 days. The final blanket 
requirement for H-1B sponsors is creating a public access file for inspection with proof 
of meeting all the stipulations. If greater than a certain percentage of employees are H-
1B workers, employers are obliged to declare that the foreign workers are not displacing 
domestic workers as well as provide proof of attempts to recruit American workers. 
                                                
2 American Immigration Council, “The H-1B Visa Program: A Primer on the Program 
and Its Impact on Jobs, Wages, and the Economy” 
3 Statista, “Which U.S. Industries File Most Work Visa Applications?” 
4 H1 Base, “Information for H1B Employers” 
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Citing the intent to keep jobs for domestic workers, in April 2017 the Trump 
administration temporarily halted expedited processing for H-1B visas, under which 
applications are reviewed within 15 days. Expedited processing was resumed on August 
18th for first-time applicants, and on October 3rd for extended-stay petitions5. The need 
for expedited processing becomes evident when taking into account that regular 
processing for applications can take over six months. 
For the healthcare industry, the removal of expedited processing may have 
potentially adverse consequences. Over 1,500 non-citizens who were offered residency 
positions at U.S. hospitals were put at risk of not receiving their visa in time by the 
suspension of expedited processing6. Hospitals that hired foreign physicians for their 
residency programs under the expectation that the visas would be quickly granted 
suffered from issues related to insufficient staffing, which may include a reduction in 
comprehensive individual care for patients, longer wait times for appointments, and 
time spent searching for replacements. These costs could compromise the quality of 
care that hospitals are able to provide for their patients. The staffing issues are 
especially pronounced in rural areas, which already suffer from doctor shortages and 
partially depend on the H-1B program to fulfill the healthcare needs of their 
populations7. Because American doctors are typically disinclined to serve in these areas, 
H-1B visa-holders constitute a high percentage of practicing physicians in rural towns. 
                                                
5 U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services, “H-1B Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 Cap Season” 
6 Parija Kavilanz, “Hospitals, doctors in limbo after fast-track processing of H-1Bs is 
halted” 
7 Michael Ollove, “Foreign-born doctors, many in underserved areas, are worried about 
their jobs” 
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The defined question that this paper will explore is whether the hiring of 
physicians with H-1B visas has an impact on the quality of healthcare that hospitals 
provide. To answer this question, I will provide new econometric evidence. In the 
following sections, I will analyze the existing literature from various branches of 
economics, present my data, model, and results, and demonstrate my findings through 
the research I have conducted. 
 
II. Literature Review 
While the impact of the H-1B visa program has been studied extensively in the 
information technology industry, and there is a plethora of research on the quality of 
medical care, literature regarding the effect of physicians with H-1B visas on the quality 
of healthcare is scarce, if at all available. The lack of research is important to address. 
Healthcare is one of the industries most affected by the H-1B program, behind 
technology, with 8,100 applications submitted by medical professionals in 20168. 
Additionally, healthcare is one of the largest industries in the U.S. If the quality of 
services is in any way affected by the presence of skilled nonimmigrant workers, the 
ability to measure that effect would be momentous. To overcome the research shortage, 
we must synthesize two separate branches of economic research: labor markets and 
healthcare. Because immigration is as much a political issue as an economic one, it is 
also essential to consider existing research on policy. 
 
 
                                                
8 Statista, “Which U.S. Industries File Most Work Visa Applications” 
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A. The Impact of H-1B Visas on Labor Markets 
As mentioned before, studies regarding the impact of the H-1B program on 
labor markets generally specific to the IT sector, being the predominant industry with 
H-1B visa applicants. Two studies I reviewed had consistent results. The Bound et al. 
2017 study compares the effects of the H-1B program on the IT sector in relatively open 
and closed economies. In the sample, they analyze the recruitment of H-1B computer 
scientists in the IT sector during the Internet boom from 1994 to 2001. They create two 
predominant models: 1) a product market in which IT firms produce goods to sell to 
consumers, and 2) a labor market for college graduates (i.e. skilled workers). The 
models include maximization functions for firm profits and utility functions for 
consumption. After statistical analysis, they conclude that in an open economy, the visa 
program raises profits in the IT sector and contributes to innovation within the firms in 
which it is implemented (Bound et al. 2017). More broadly, it can lower prices of goods 
and increase consumption.  
A noteworthy concern raised is that nonimmigrant workers might displace 
domestic workers. The study states that critics of the program claim employers recruit 
cheap foreign labor to replace domestic workers. The empirical evidence discovered 
through their research appears to support this conclusion. Bound et al. 2017 finds that 
the H-1B visa program crowds out domestic workers: the hiring of H-1B computer 
scientists seems to cause domestic computer scientists to move into non-CS fields, 
which lowers the average wages in the firms. When interpreting the results, Bound et al. 
2017 suggests that the positive effects of the H-1B program may not fully offset the 
negative ones. 
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An earlier study by Doran et al. 2014 has similar conclusions: the H-1B visa 
program appears to result in lower average earnings and higher firm profits in the IT 
sector. Doran et al. 2014 also finds evidence for the presence of a crowding out effect. 
They argue that the crowding out effect is substantial enough that H-1B and non H-1B 
workers might be perfect substitutes (Doran et al. 2014). This conclusion may be 
extreme, especially when considering the cost to firms for sponsoring visa applications 
as well as employer willingness to hire temporary workers with the knowledge that they 
must be replaced in the foreseeable future. 
By contrast, a third study contests the definitive conclusion of the crowding out 
effect in H-1B sponsoring firms. Luthra 2009 argues there is existing empirical 
evidence for both the presence and absence of the crowding-out effect, and as such, the 
debate is more political than empirical. In a similar vein to Bound et al. 2017 and Doran 
et al. 2014, Luthra claims that the H-1B program increases the flexibility of labor and 
production in firms (Luthra 2009).  
However, the Luthra 2009 study has a different focus. She analyzes whether the 
likelihood of contingent employment varies between immigrants who have lived in the 
U.S. for a time period shorter than six years (a group she uses as representative of H-1B 
workers) and longer-term residents. The primary finding is that immigrants who have 
been in the U.S. for fewer than six years are more likely to be contingent workers, and 
empirical evidence supports that contingent workers receive fewer benefits than long-
term employees. A secondary conclusion is that contingent workers do not receive 
lower wages than permanent workers. Luthra 2009 also argues that H-1B visas are in 
high demand despite their short-term disadvantages, such as fewer employment options 
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and benefits, because the foreign workers who apply plan to eventually become U.S. 
citizens. It would be interesting in future research to explore whether former H-1B 
workers who become permanent residents create a long-term crowding out effect. 
 
B. Measures of Healthcare Quality 
Over time, measures of the quality of healthcare have been standardized by 
researchers and healthcare professionals. Mainz 2003 defines and describes various 
indicators of quality in his paper. He states that typically, these indicators are 
established through existing evidence and literature or agreed upon by a panel of health 
experts. The first category Mainz 2003 mentions is rate-based indicators, such as the 
percentage of patients who are infected during surgery and the number of patients who 
die in surgery. A second broad category is structure and process indicators, which 
includes the proportion of specialists to other doctors, the number of beds in the 
hospital, and the use of diagnostic technologies. Mainz 2003 claims that for the 
indicators in this category to be reliable, they must be correlated with a desirable effect 
on health outcomes. The aforementioned rate-based indicators, as well as patient 
satisfaction, are examples of outcome indicators, and their usage is ideal for analyzing 
long-term data (Mainz 2003). 
In econometric studies, we see that the types of indicators Mainz 2003 details 
are frequently used to evaluate quality of healthcare. Clark 2006 uses an outcome 
indicator, creating a quantitative survey given to patients, physicians, and other hospital 
employees to evaluate the quality of healthcare provided. He perceives these three 
groups as “the three co-creators of health” (Clark 2006). His findings suggest that good 
	12	
organization and strong relationships between patients, physicians, and employees lead 
to patient base retention and growth, which is reflective of the quality of care. He claims 
such relationships determine a hospital’s success (Clark 2006).  
Lichtenberg 2011 instead utilizes process and structure indicators to measure the 
effect of healthcare quality on average life expectancy. He considers the percentage of 
advanced diagnostic imaging procedures used, the percentage of physicians at a hospital 
who attended top-ranking medical schools, and the average quality of prescription 
drugs. Lichtenberg 2011 finds as the primary result that each of the three indicators is 
statistically significant, and each increases the average life expectancy. Additionally, 
Lichtenberg 2011 concludes that an increase in life expectancy is not correlated to 
health insurance rates or education levels of patients, and that states increasing their 
spending on diagnostic imaging do not have higher per capita medical expenditures. 
 
C. Politics of Nonimmigrant Work 
One researcher poses the question of whether the growth rates of various 
nonimmigrant worker groups affect the likelihood of elected state officials passing E-
Verify policies (Udani 2016). Under these policies, employers are entitled to review the 
work authorization of new employees to ensure they are legally working in the U.S. As 
test groups, Udani 2016 focuses on H-1B workers (high-skilled) as well as H-2A and H-
2B workers (non-specialty, employed in agricultural and non-agricultural fields, 
respectively). As explanatory variables, he considers annual state unemployment rate, 
the percentage of Democratic officials in state legislatures, states using E-Verify as pilot 
program, and whether neighboring states have enacted E-Verify policy within the 
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previous year. In a second regression, Udani 2016 incorporates proxies for racial 
prejudices; he uses the immigration rates from Asian countries to represent the model 
minority stereotype, and the Mexican immigration rate as representative of the low-
skilled labor stereotype.  
In both models, the results are statistically significant. Udani 2016 finds that 
states with high growth rates of H-1B workers adopt E-Verify policies more slowly, 
while states with high growth rates of non-specialty immigrant workers pass these 
policies more quickly. He argues that the high demand for H-1B workers supports 
stereotypes of ‘good’ workers, and takes away the motivation to create legislation for 
employee verification. Udani 2016 concludes state officials have ambiguous attitudes 
toward immigration, and legislation is largely dependent on American perceptions of 
immigrant groups, in which both class bias and racial bias have central roles. 
 
III. Data 
In creating my dataset for this empirical analysis, I collected data from four 
different sources. The first source I encountered was the My Visa Jobs website, which 
provided data on the number of certified, certified-withdrawn, denied, and withdrawn 
applications sponsored from 2013 to 2016 by the top 100 sponsoring hospitals and 
networks in the U.S. In my analysis, I decided to include only the number of certified 
physicians. Initially, I had hoped to include data from these four years, but the Census 
Bureau, another source I consulted, did not release demographic information for 2016 
early enough for the purposes of this project. Thus, my dataset was constrained to 2015 
on the upper side. For area characteristics, I noted whether each hospital was located in 
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an urban or rural area using U.S. News Health. Finally, I referred to archived Physician 
Compare and Hospital Compare datasets made available by Medicare. The former 
provided the total number of physicians per hospital and per network, and the latter 
supplied data for my chosen dependent variables. The data is cross-sectional and 
strongly balanced, organized by the generated hospital identification variable and year. 
Descriptive statistics for each variable are listed in Table 1 in the Appendix. The 
calculated sample means and standard deviations for the variables are reasonable, which 
suggests a lack of major mistakes in collecting data. 
As stated before, the number of H-1B certified physicians for the top 100 
sponsoring hospitals and networks came from the My Visa Jobs website. Because my 
goal was to measure the effect of the visa program on individual hospitals, an 
immediate issue was to maximize the amount of available data used in my regressions. 
As a solution, I gathered data on both dependent and explanatory variables for the 
individual hospitals associated with each network. I created one dataset for individual 
hospitals, and another for H-1B data for networks. Then, I created a network 
identification variable to match individual hospitals to their respective networks. 
Additionally, because there were multiple observations for each year, I created a 
hospital identification variable. There were issues with repeat observations; some of the 
hospitals for which individual data was reported were also included in networks, and 
some were members of multiple networks. Another limitation was missing observations 
for certain hospitals. After dropping those data points, the dataset included a total of 293 
observations. 
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For specific information about hospitals, I used archived Medicare datasets. 
Medicare reported data on the number of physicians per hospital and per network in its 
Physician Compare datasets, which was useful given the similar reporting of H-1B 
certification. From this data, I calculated the percentage of physicians with H-1B visas 
employed by individual hospitals and networks for every year. In the case of networks, 
the same percentage was applied to each constituent hospital. However, Medicare did 
not provide physician data prior to 2014. Under the assumption that the number of 
physicians employed per hospital would not drastically vary between years, I repeated 
the value given in 2014 for 2013. A second limitation was the unavailability of 
physician data for certain hospitals in my dataset. For these hospitals, I used the value 
listed on each hospital website as a repeat observation for each year. The Hospital 
Compare datasets from 2013 to 2015 provided data on all the dependent variables: 
HCAHPS base score, HCAHPS consistency score, the 30-day heart failure mortality 
rate, the 30-day heart failure readmission rate, and the 30-day hospital-wide 
readmission rate. The datasets also included whether each hospital was owned by the 
government, a for-profit company, or a nonprofit; I included ownership as a potential 
explanatory variable for quality of healthcare. 
I utilized the Fact Finder tool to find information about the median inflation-
adjusted wage, median population age, and number of males per 100 females for the 
cities in which the hospitals were located. With a higher median wage, the population in 
question likely has a greater amount of disposable income, presumably leading to more 
effective demand for a better quality of healthcare. Living in a city or town with higher 
average wages may also be a source of attraction for physicians who seek to pay off 
	16	
their student loans. Median age may have a potentially large impact on the demand for 
healthcare as well. Similarly, urban areas may be more appealing to physicians than 
rural towns. It has been well-documented that medical needs increase with age. I chose 
to include the number of males per 100 females in my regressions because men and 
women have different healthcare needs, which may also affect the quality of services 
provided by hospitals. 
 
IV. Model 
My model analyzes the effect of H-1B employment on the quality of healthcare 
based on the five different dependent variables previously mentioned: HCAHPS base 
score, HCAHPS consistency score, the 30-day heart failure mortality rate, the 30-day 
heart failure readmission rate, and the 30-day hospital-wide readmission rate. I ran 
linear multiple regressions with each dependent variable to examine the potential 
impact of the program.  
HCAHPS is a hospital scoring system based on patient evaluations regarding 
eight different categories, including effectiveness of nurse and doctor communication, 
pain management, and cleanliness9. Patients only fill out one HCAHPS survey, but two 
separate scores are calculated. The base score is calculated out of 80 points, rewarding 
hospitals for achievement and improvement in each of the eight categories. By contrast, 
the consistency score is scored out of 20 points and reports hospitals’ lowest-performing 
                                                
9 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, “CMS Issues Final Rule for First Year 
of Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program” 
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category10. Because Medicare reported the scores independently, I decided to run 
separate regressions rather than combining the scores into one variable. Although 
patient surveys are not subjective indicators of quality of care, perception may have a 
discernible effect on health outcomes. For example, patients who feel that they are 
receiving high-quality care might experience a placebo-like effect that could contribute 
to their healing process.  
The remaining three dependent variables – heart failure mortality rate, heart 
failure readmission rate, and hospital-wide readmission rate – I chose due to their status 
as standard indicators for quality of healthcare. Accessibility also shaped my decision; 
many of the reported variables in the Medicare datasets were not supplemented by a 
code to explain the scoring system. The values for mortality and readmission were 
widely available, and as each observation was a percentage, interpretation was 
straightforward.  
All five regressions were in the same format, with only the dependent variable 
changing between regressions: 
 𝑌" = ℎ1𝑏 ∗ 𝑋") + 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝐷") + 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑐 ∗ 𝑋"4 + ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑛1 ∗ 𝐷"4 + ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑛3∗ 𝐷": + 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑔𝑒 ∗ 𝑋"< + 𝑚𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ 𝑋": + 𝑢" 
 
symbolically written as: 
 𝑌" = 𝛽)𝑋") + 𝛽4𝐷") + 𝛽<𝑋"4 + 𝛽:𝐷"4 + 𝛽A𝐷": + 𝛽B𝑋"< + 𝛽C𝑋": + 𝑢" 
                                                
10 HCAHPS Fact Sheet, November 2017	
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Here, h1b is defined as the percentage of physicians with H-1B visas at each 
hospital. Areachar is a binary variable set equal to 0 if the hospital is in an urban area 
and 1 if the hospital is rural. Medianinc is the median inflation-adjusted wage for the 
population in the city or town where the hospital is located. Hospown1 is equal to 0 if 
the hospital is government-owned, and hospown3 is equal to 0 if the hospital is 
nonprofit. Medage is the average age of the population and mfratio is the number of 
males per 100 females; both are specific to the hospital’s location. 
My null hypothesis for the model was statistical insignificance of the 
coefficients of all the explanatory variables (𝛽) = 𝛽4 = 𝛽< = 𝛽: = 𝛽A = 𝛽B = 𝛽C = 0). 
To correct for heteroskedasticity, I conducted random-effects GLS regressions. I chose 
random-effects over fixed-effects because the coefficients of my explanatory variables 
did not change between the corrected and uncorrected regressions. I deemed it 
unnecessary to correct for multicollinearity due to low R2 values in each regression, 
which will be addressed in the results. Additionally, I decided not to correct for 
autocorrelation, as my data was not time series. 
 
V. Results11 
A. Regression 1: HCAHPS Base Score 
In the first regression, the only variables found to be statistically significant 
were median inflation-adjusted wage (𝛽< = 0.00022, 𝑝 > |𝑧| = 0.000) and nonprofit 
hospital ownership (𝛽A = −9.344, 𝑝 > 𝑧 = 0.015). The magnitude of median wage 
                                                
11 The full results of my statistical analyses are detailed in the index 
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at first appears small enough to be negligible: with an increase of $1, the base score 
increases by 0.00022 point. It is more compelling, however, to consider substantial 
changes in median wage. With a $10,000 increase, for example, the base score is 
expected to increase by 2.2 points. This may imply that the cost of living is so high that 
income must considerably increase to make a substantial difference in the perceived 
quality of healthcare.  
Nonprofit hospital ownership has a more immediately obvious effect on the base 
score. If the hospital is run by a nonprofit organization, the base score is expected to be 
lower by 9.344 points than otherwise. Area characteristics are nearly statistically 
significant (𝛽4 = 5.30, 𝑝 > 𝑧 = 0.079). Perhaps with a larger sample size, I would 
have found statistical significance. The model explains approximately 15.04 percent of 
the variation in the HCAHPS Base Score. 
 
B. Regression 2: HCAHPS Consistency Score 
In the second regression, the median inflation-adjusted wage remains 
statistically significant, with a coefficient of 0.0000439 and a p-value of 0.005. With a 
$10,000 increase in median income, the consistency score is predicted to increase by 
0.439 point. To compare the magnitude to that of the HCAHPS base score, I scaled the 
base score down to 20 and found a predicted increase is 0.55 point for a $10,000 
increase in median inflation-adjusted wage. When on the same scale, the coefficients 
are similar, with roughly a 20 percent difference. This should not be surprising, given 
the shared origin of the two scores. Again, it implies that a large change in income is 
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required for a discernible difference in patients’ perception of the quality of healthcare 
provided.  
Area characteristics are also statistically significant in this regression: if the 
hospital is in a rural area, the consistency score is expected to increase by 1.67 points 
(𝑝 > 𝑧 = 0.016). This model explains roughly 16.16 percent of the variation in the 
HCAHPS Consistency Score. 
 
C. Regression 3: 30-Day Heart Failure Mortality Rate 
In the 30-day heart failure mortality rate regression, the median inflation-
adjusted wage is no longer statistically significant. Area characteristics are again found 
to be significant. The mortality rate is predicted to be 1.24 percent higher in rural areas 
in comparison to urban areas (𝑝 > 𝑧 = 0.000). One potential explanation for this 
result is that hospitals may be farther or more difficult to access in rural areas, and 
patients might not arrive in time for effective treatment.  
Government hospital ownership is another statistically significant explanatory 
variable, predicted to decrease the mortality rate by approximately 0.89 percent (𝑝 >𝑧 = 0.015). One possibility is that government-run hospitals have stricter guidelines 
for healthcare providers, leading to a lower mortality rate.  
Of the five regressions, this is the only one to result in the statistical significance 
of the percentage of H-1B physicians (𝑝 > 𝑧 = 0.003). For every 5 percent increase 
in visa-holding physicians, the mortality rate is expected to increase by 0.245 percent. 
This effect is miniscule and arguably economically insignificant.  The model explains 
approximately 13.8 percent of the variation in the 30-day heart failure mortality rate. 
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D. Regression 4: 30-Day Heart Failure Readmission Rate 
When running a statistical analysis on the 30-day heart failure readmission rate, 
the only statistically significant explanatory variable is area characteristics (𝛽4 =−1.10,			𝑝 > 𝑧 = 0.001). The implication is that the heart failure readmission rate in 
rural hospitals is 1.10 percent lower than in urban hospitals. It may be that rural 
hospitals with fewer specialized physicians send patients to major hospitals in urban 
areas, thus explaining the lower readmission rate.  
In this regression, the male to female ratio is statistically significant at the 10 
percent level, but not at the 5 percent level (𝛽C = −0.49, 𝑝 > 𝑧 = 0.071). This result 
might change with a larger sample size. The model explains roughly 12.52 percent of 
the variation in the 30-day heart failure readmission rate. 
 
E. Regression 5: 30-Day Hospital-Wide Readmission Rate 
In the final regression, three explanatory variables are statistically significant: 
area characteristics, median inflation-adjusted wage, and government ownership. If the 
hospital is rural, the hospital-wide readmission rate is expected to decrease by 1.06 
percent (𝑝 > 𝑧 = 0.000) as compared to urban hospitals. As stated before, this may 
result from sending patients to major urban hospitals. 
Median income has such a small effect on the readmission rate that it may be 
negligible altogether. If income increases by $10,000, the hospital-wide readmission 
rate decreases by roughly 0.08 percent (𝑝 > 𝑧 = 0.028).  
Lastly, if a hospital is government-owned, the readmission rate is predicted to 
decrease by about 1.06 percent (𝑝 > 𝑧 = 0.026). A possible explanation is the fact 
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that government-owned hospitals are penalized for high readmission rates. As a 
consequence, they may admit less severe cases to keep their readmission rates low. The 
model explains approximately 29.95 percent of the variation in the 30-day hospital-wide 
readmission rate. In this regression again, the male to female readmission rate is only 
significant at the 10 percent level (𝛽C = −0.027, 𝑝 > 𝑧 = 0.073). 
 
VI. Discussion 
Because the statistical significance of my explanatory variables is inconsistent 
across the five regressions, the results of my empirical analysis are inconclusive. 
Therefore, I cannot make any definitive claims regarding the effects of my explanatory 
variables on the quality of healthcare. In one instance, the coefficients for an 
explanatory variable (area characteristics) have opposite signs in regressions with 
different quality indicators, indicating that overall hospital quality is much more 
difficult to measure than I had previously anticipated. 
The statistical insignificance of the percentage of H-1B physicians in the 
regressions with patient survey results has compelling implications. It suggests that the 
presence of H-1B certified physicians does not impact patient perception of care. More 
importantly, this implies an absence of prejudice toward foreign workers in evaluating 
the quality of care. Even if the results had been significant, the predicted change would 
have been increased HCAHPS base and consistency scores, which is a fascinating 
result. It does not appear to contradict existing literature. The finding that highly 
educated nonimmigrant physicians are not perceived as providing an inferior quality of 
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healthcare reflects the possibility of class bias rather than racial bias, which 
complements the Udani 2016 results. 
I was surprised that median population age was not significant in any of the five 
regressions. It may be attributed to the limited range of median age in my sample; the 
lower bound is 23.1 years and the upper bound is 53.1 years. Had I used a measure to 
encompass the elderly population, I may have found that age has a significant impact on 
the quality indicators of healthcare included. 
There are a couple of limitations in my model that must be addressed in future 
research. First, because my sample comes from the top 100 sponsoring hospitals and 
networks rather than a random selection, there is potential for selection bias. I cannot 
conclude for certain whether sponsorship is correlated with other factors related to 
quality. Secondly, the potential exists for endogeneity. For example, an indicator of 
quality might affect the number of applicants a hospital sponsors instead of the reverse, 
which I specified in my model. 
I was slightly disappointed by the low R2 values obtained from each regression, 
but unsurprised by this result because there were additional explanatory variables I 
wanted to include for which I could not find data. In future analysis, variables that I 
would like to analyze are health insurance rates, the quality of education for both 
physicians and the general population, whether the physicians were educated abroad or 
in U.S., and the average physician salary. I would also like to expand my sample size in 
subsequent work to observe whether statistical significance and the magnitudes of the 
coefficients of my variables change. 
	24	
A point of future research might be to explore whether the H-1B visa program 
has common labor market outcomes between the healthcare industry and the IT 
industry. It would be interesting to discover whether physicians working in hospitals 
that sponsor H-1B applications are subject to lower average wages and if there is a 
crowding-out effect for domestic physicians. Given the shortage of doctors in rural 
towns, I suspect that the crowding-out effect would be absent. The findings of such a 
study could have major implications for immigration policy. Perhaps the cap on H-1B 
visas might be revised, or a certain number of visas would be specifically designated for 
medical professionals.  
	25	
VII. Appendix 
A.	Variable	Definitions	
h1b percentage of phyicians per hospital that are H-1B visa holders 
areachar =0 if hospital in urban area, =1 if rural 
medianinc median income in the area in which a hospital is located 
hospown1 =0 if hospital is government-owned 
hospown2 =0 if hospital ownership is proprietary (omitted) 
hospown3 =0 if hospital is nonprofit 
mfratio number of males per 100 females in area where hospital is located 
HCAHPSbase base patient satisfaction score (out of 80) 
HCAHPScons hospital consistency score as rated by patients (out of 20) 
hfmr 30-day heart failure readmission rate 
hfrr 30-day heart failure readmission rate 
orr 30-day hospital-wide readmission rate 
 
  
	26	
B.	Tables	
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
h1b 293 6.710634 5.95099 0 29.701 
areachar 293 0.2264505 0.4480074 0 1 
medianinc 293 47977.05 19621.76 25697 143017 
hospown1 293 0.7610922 0.4271459 0 1 
hospown3 293 0.2764505 0.4480074 0 1 
medage 293 35.54812 5.397764 23.1 53.1 
mfratio 293 92.88157 5.439808 70.6 116.2 
HCAHPSbase 293 19.83959 13.7718 0 73 
HCAHPScons 293 15.30034 3.895717 3 20 
hfmr 293 11.39966 1.925451 7.7 17.8 
hfrr 293 22.31365 2.302787 15.9 28.6 
orr 293 16.2785 1.262437 13.3 20.1 
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Table 2: Coefficients and Standard Errors 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Reg 1: 
HCAHPS 
Base Score 
Reg 2: 
HCAHPS 
Consistency 
Score 
Reg 3: HF 
Mortality 
Rate 
Reg 4:  HF 
Readmission 
Rate 
Reg 5: 
Overall 
Readmission 
Rate 
H-1B .1215774 .0517644 .049244 -.0359008 .0149417 
 (.1684432) (.0461279) (.0157509) (.0230185) (.0148334) 
Area 
Characteristics 
5.295546 1.67405 1.248165 -1.102766 -1.058881 
 (3.015862) (0.6951887) (.2931554) (.3258784) (.2104384) 
Median 
Income 
.0002201 .0000439 .0000101 -5.10e-06 -8.29e-06 
 (.0000498) (.0000151) (.0000102) (7.16e-06) (3.77e-06) 
Government-
Owned 
-4.535456 -1.0859 -.8866656 -.6131255 -.9011608 
 (4.498514) (1.923974) (.3632007) (.6622426) (.4057055) 
Nonprofit -9.344216 -2.922484 -.5251336 .6315021 .1124094 
 (3.827671) (1.676985) (.3488361) (.6154594) (.3729151) 
Median Age -.1384387 -.0687482 -.001131 .0284989 -.0101258 
 (.3559948) (.0687482) (.0231396) (.0316466) (.0207126) 
MF Ratio -.0174617 -.0048168 .0166812 -.0485827 -.027623 
 (.1890167) (.0371325) (.0190811) (.0268757) (.0153875) 
Constant 20.80459 15.32706 9.509636 26.89952 20.43958 
 (23.94355) 4.950003 (2.198073) (2.954671) (1.701021) 
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Table 3: Probabilities 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Reg 1: 
HCAHPS 
Base 
Score 
Reg 2: 
HCAHPS 
Consistency 
Score 
Reg 3: HF 
Mortality 
Rate 
Reg 4: HF 
Readmission 
Rate 
 Reg 5: 
Overall 
Readmission 
Rate 
H-1B z=0.72 z=1.12 z=3.13 z=-1.56 z=1.01 
 P|z|=0.470 P|z|=0.262 P|z|=0.002 P|z|=0.119 P|z|=0.314 
Area 
Characteristics 
z=1.76 z=2.41 z=4.26 z=-3.38 z=-5.03 
 P|z|=0.079 P|z|=0.016 P|z|=0.000 P|z|=0.001 P|z|=0.000 
Median Income z=4.42 z=2.90 z=0.99 z=-0.71 z=-2.20 
 P|z|=0.000 P|z|=0.004 P|z|=0.322 P|z|=0.476 P|z|=0.028 
Government-
Owned 
z=-1.01 z=-0.56 z=-2.44 z=-0.93 z=-2.22 
 P|z|=0.313 P|z|=0.572 P|z|=0.015 P|z|=0.355 P|z|=0.026 
Nonprofit z=-2.44 z=-1.74 z=-1.51 z=1.03 z=0.30 
 P|z|=0.015 P|z|=0.081 P|z|=0.132 P|z|=0.305 P|z|=0.763 
Median Age z=-0.39 z=-0.70 z=-0.00 z=0.90 z=-0.49 
 P|z|=0.697 P|z|=0.487 P|z|=0.996 P|z|=0.368 P|z|=0.625 
MF Ratio z=-0.09 z=0.13 z=0.87 z=-1.81 z=-1.80 
 P|z|=0.926 P|z|=0.897 P|z|=0.382 P|z|=0.071 P|z|=0.073 
Constant z=0.87 z=3.10 z=4.33 z=9.10 z=12.02 
 P|z|=0.385 P|z|=0.002 P|z|=0.000 P|z|=0.000 P|z|=0.000 
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Table 4: 95% Confidence Intervals 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Reg 1: 
HCAHPS 
Base Score 
Reg 2: 
HCAHPS 
Consistency 
Score 
Reg 3: HF 
Mortality 
Rate 
Reg 4: HF 
Readmission 
Rate 
Reg 5: 
Overall 
Readmission 
Rate 
H-1B -.2085651 -.0386446 .0183728 -.0810162 -.0141312 
 .45172 0.1421734 .0801153 -.0092146 .0440146 
Area 
Characteristics 
-.6154351 0.3115055 .6735912 -1.741476 -1.471333 
 11.20653 3.036595 1.822739 -.4640564 -.6464299 
Median Income 0.0001225 0.0000142 -9.88e-06 -.0000191 -.0000157 
 0.0003177 0.0000736 .0000301 8.94e-06 -8.99e-06 
Government-
Owned 
-13.35238 -4.856819 -1.598526 -1.911097 -1.696329 
 4.281469 2.685019 -.1748054 .6848462 -.1059926 
Nonprofit -16.84631 -.6209313 -1.20884 -.5747761 -.6184907 
 -1.842119 .3643455 .1585726 1.83778 .8433096 
Median Age -.8361757 -.1825774 -.0454659 -.0335274 -.0507218 
 .5592984 .0869106 .0452397 .0905252 .0304701 
MF Ratio -.3879276 -.0679615 -.0207171 -.101258 -.0577819 
 0.3530043 .0775951 .0540794 .0040926 .002536 
Constant -27.52534 5.625232 5.201492 21.10847 17.10564 
 67.21794 25.02889 13.81778 32.69057 23.77352 
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